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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

The  communiques  after the Moscow  Conference  stated that the
majority of the questions which had been settled concerned military
problems, but the preliminaries at any rate of the questions concerning
the occupation of not only Germany and her satellites., but also of the
countries who had fought against Hitler, namely,  Poland, Norway,
Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia and Greece, had been approached.    The
clause that the Great Powers " after the end of hostilities will not use
their forces on the territories of the other States, excluding the aims
announced in this Statement, and after mutual consultation " was a
formula which v/ould permit of the occupation of other countries for an
indefinite period.   In the language of the Soviet politicians, it meant
that, according to this Article 6 of the Declaration, the Kremlin could
use armed forces during the war on the territories of the other States,
including those of the Allies^ for purposes entirely alien to the ones stated
in the Declaration, for deportation, recruitment, plebiscites, creation
of puppet governments and furthermore, could execute ail these activities
without consulting Britain, the United States and the rest of the United
Nations.   Thus, those few words added by Molotov to the text of Cordell
Hull, " after the end of hostilities " not merely changed the sense of the
Declaration itself but, in fact, shelved the principles of the Atlantic
Charter and established the spheres of occupation.   The outcome of this
at the end of hostilities must be judged from past experience, Russia once
having occupied enemy territory or entered any friendly country in war-
time, has never been willing to leave it afterwards.    It can well be
imagined what arguments and actions would be necessary to force her to
quit the countries of East and Central Europe, which, by the twists of
war, found themselves in Russian power.    Since, according to the opinion
of Moscow, practically every country in the path of the Red Army was
6 liberated ' by it (with the assistance of the local army previously created
in the U.S.S.R., Polish, Austrian, Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
as the case may be), a more lengthy stay by the Russian Army would be
simply a c friendly ' gesture to that country.    In such a role the Russian
troops c invited ' by Marshal Tito had entered Yugoslavia.

TEHERAN DEFEAT.
If Europe fails, all fail. If Europe's problem can be solved, there is hope
that the problem can be solved everywhere.
(Sir Walter Layton, The British Commonwealth, London, 1944))
At the end of 1943 by a decree of fate, two great opponents, repre-
sentatives of two different systems of life stood face to face at Teheran,
each with his own plan for a new European order, and each hoping to
secure thereby his own country after the anticipated victory over Germany.
They had both been outstanding builders during their lifetime, and
defenders of their respective systems. Each had expressed his creed and
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